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no nervousness dealing overtly with universals." She attributes this confidence to "the pervasiveness of Platonic and Neo-Platonic conceptions of reality . . . imitating Plotinus' ideal form and order."4 As Kristeller had previously noted, for the Neoplatonist, the "true poet does not follow the arbitrary impulse of human thought, but is inspired by God."5 Sidney seems to need this justification as much as any other theorist. Like the boldest Neoplatonists before him, he praises the poet as a free creator "lifted up with the vigour of his own invention . . . freely ranging only within the zodiac of his own wit" (p. 100). He is free of nature and of any given subject matter; he does not derive "conceit out of a matter, but maketh matter for a conceit" (p. 120). But in the Apology, Sidney tends to regard the protection the Platonic-Augustinian argument would afford as part of a voice that he self-consciously affects, a voice he asks us to think about critically, even as he uses it to provide terms for the poet's creativity.
Sidney's discussion of poetic inspiration, for example, is deliberately tangled and ambivalent. He starts by examining the Roman term for poet, vates: he translates this "heavenly" title as "diviner, forseer, or prophet" and says that the Romans attributed the power of prophecy to Vergil. Sidney then gives us two contradictory reactions to this information. First he condemns the Romans for their "vain and godless superstition" (p. 98), and then he tells us they were "altogether not without ground." He softens his criticisms because "that same exquisite observing of number and measure in words, and that high flying liberty of conceit proper to the poet, did seem to have some divine force in it" (p. 99). The poet, then, is not really inspired; his heavenly and divine nature is at best metaphorical. It is an illusion, but an understandable one, based on verbal artifice and the "high flying liberty of conceit." The irony is clear: inspiration is not the cause of the poet's conceit but the effect that the conceit has on the reader.
Where Sidney does mention poets who were truly inspired by God (David, Solomon, et al.), he is careful to set them apart from "right poets," his subject.6 He makes so many motions in distinguishing these right poets from philosophical and historical poets (those who follow a "proposed subject" instead of their own "invention") that another distinction is easily missed.7 It can, however, be deduced easily enough, and it is equally important to his argument. Sidney is interested in a poetic grounded entirely in the human mind, and inspiration would compromise its autonomy. As Sidney tells us later, Plato in his Ion "attributeth unto Poesy more than myself do, namely, to be a very inspiring of a divine force, far above man's wit" (p. 130).
Sidney's use of metaphysics can be deceptive. Though he uses its terms to praise the poet's creativity, he then dismisses them before they can compromise the mind's autonomy. The same pattern recurs immediately after the vates discussion, when Sidney turns to the word "poet": "It cometh of this word poiein, which is 'to make.'" Sidney's use of Greek etymology, like Landino's, serves as an occasion to praise the poet, and Sidney follows with his famous celebration of poetry's golden world and the poet's creation of a new nature. Sidney then defends his claims:
Neither let it be deemed too saucy a comparison to balance the highest point of man's wit with the efficacy of Nature; but rather give right honour to the heavenly Maker of that maker, who having made man to His own likeness, set him beyond and over all the works of that second nature: which in nothing he showeth so much as in Poetry, when with the force of a divine breath he bringeth things forth far surpassing her doings, with no small argument to the incredulous of that first accursed fall of Adam: since our erected wit maketh us know what perfection is, and yet our infected will keepeth us from reaching unto it.
(p. 101) Our position in the universe is a gift of God, and we are fitted into a hierarchical series of makers, beginning with God, who surpasses us, and nature, which we surpass. But if the gift explains our capacity, it does not control our use of it or bind it to the fixed order of things. After the vates argument, the "divine breath" must be metaphorical, referring to our own efforts to bring forth our own creations, perhaps echoing Scaliger's claim that man "transforms himself into a second deity." We reveal our divinity through our own effort. But, more important, there is no clear transition from the mind's operations to its transcen-dental source. Sidney's "highest point of man's wit" is not a mystical apex mentis directly sparked by the divine. It is the faculty that creates fictions, the faculty that creates another nature and so reveals our divinity to ourselves. In order to demonstrate "erected wit," we must be "lifted up with the vigour of [our] own invention" (p. 100). We know our Ideas, not by tracing them back to an eternal logos, but by making them "manifest, by delivering them forth in such excellency as [we have] imagined them" (p. 101).
Furthermore, the above quotation on the hierarchy of makers is a defense of one possible metaphor, an attempt to show that it is not "too saucy." After his magnificent praise of the erected wit, Sidney tells us:
But these arguments will by few be understood, and by fewer granted. Thus much (1 hope) will be given me, that the Greeks with some probability of reason gave him the name above all names of learning.
(p. 101)
All is suddenly qualified as Sidney reminds us that the passage is part of a voice he has assumed for the sake of a few debatable arguments. He is not concerned with establishing their objective validity, and he neither affirms nor denies them. He is satisfied with showing that, at best, they point to "some probability of reason." Indeed, the entire argument for the poet as maker is not so much a justification of the wit as a demonstration of it. It is a bold "comparison," which, according to Aristotle and Renaissance rhetoricians, is a prime way of exhibiting wit.8
II
If the poet is "lifted up with the vigour of his own invention," so too is the reader. Poetry is the best teacher, the "first light-giver to ignorance," and the first study to show us a "pleasure in the exercises of the mind" (pp. 96, 98). The separation of the Idea from a fixed ontology, moreover, makes poetry a special kind of exercise. In a fascinating article, A. E. Malloch argues that, for Sidney, it is only in poetry that reason finds an object properly proportioned to its capacities. But Malloch sees this in a Thomist light: the fallen world is deficient, while poetry's golden world reveals a "fullness of being," which fully actualizes the act of cognition.9 I would argue, on the contrary, that the poetic object is best proportioned to our reason because that object is a projection of our reason. Jacopo Mazzoni made this very argument in Italy, only a few years after the Apology was written. The object of poetic imitation is one that is consciously framed to fit the poet's intellectual needs.10
The more autonomous the poet's Idea becomes, however, the more insistent the need to attach it to something outside itself. And if a metaphysical foundation is lacking, then a practical and ethical application becomes all-important. The function of poetry is to reform the will, as well as to perfect the wit, since "no learning is so good as that which teacheth and moveth to virtue" (p. 123). Using a suggestive pun, Sidney writes, "the poet ... doth draw the mind more effectually than any other art doth" (p. 115). The poet both depicts the mind and leads it to action. And this brings us to the second part of Sidney's theory, that poetry is justified not only by the brilliance of the Idea but by the way it works in the world, bestowing a "Cyrus upon the world to make many Cyruses."
Sidney echoes the humanists' rhetorical interpretation of poetry, and following Minturno's transference of Cicero's "teach, delight, and move" from the orator to the poet, he writes that poets "imitate both to delight and teach: and delight to move men to take that goodness in hand" (p. 103). According to Paul Alpers, this is the distinctive mark of Sidney's "golden world." It is not a self-consistent "heterocosm," a "self-contained universe of discourse." Rather, Sidney stresses the didactic efficacy of the poet's moral exempla.11
But if poetry makes a rhetorical address to the reader, it does so only in a way that conforms to Sidney's radical conception of the status of a poet's Idea, a way that Sidney defines by opposing poets to philosophers and historians.
A philosopher claims that, by teaching what virtue is, his discipline makes clear "how it extendeth itself out of the limits of a man's own little world to the government of families, and maintaining of public societies" (p. 105). Ac-cording to Sidney, a philosopher never extends himself; he is trapped within the closed world of his fellow philosophers: "the philosopher teacheth, but he teacheth obscurely, so as the learned only can understand him; that is to say, he teacheth them that are already taught" (p. 109). A philosopher depends on others coming to him, into his own exclusive world. While pretending to point out the limitations of philosophers, Sidney parodies the circularity of their discourse: Nay truly, learned men have learnedly thought that where once reason hath so much overmastered passion as that the mind hath a free desire to do well, the inward light each mind hath in itself is as good as a philosopher's book; seeing in Nature we know it is well to do well.
(p. 113)
The learned learnedly discuss how it is well to do well, but their terms only point to themselves: "happy is that man who may understand The poet knows that the mind must work through conjectures and that examples can lead only to "a conjectured likelihood." Thus the poet is freed from imitating things as they have been, the "bare was," and is able to concentrate, instead, on the modes of understanding themselves, the lines of connection or consequence that the mind attempts to draw in making sense out of the world. Examples in poetry are framed according "to that which is most reasonable," not according to any external res. It is of small importance that the historian can boast of bringing us "images of true matters, such as indeed were done, and not such as fantastically or falsely may be suggested to have been done" (p. 109). The historian knows better "how this world goeth than how his own wit runneth" (p. 105). The poet, by contrast, having no law but wit, can frame examples into purified types of moral ideals: "If the poet do his part aright, he will show you in Tantalus, Atreus, and such like, nothing that is not to be shunned; in Cyrus, Aeneas, Ulysses, each thing to be followed" (p. 110). The poet faces a brazen world, a foolish world of moral disorder that snares the historian in its senselessness, but delivers a golden world, another nature structured by reason. If we look back to the Idea/Cyrus passage, we can see how insistently Sidney attempts to join his golden world and his didacticism in a bond of dialectical necessity. The poet's fiction, the delivering of the Idea, is not wholly imaginative, as we are wont to say by them that build castles in the air; but so far substantially it worketh, not only to make a Cyrus, which had been but a particular excellency as Nature might have done, but to bestow a Cyrus upon the world, to make many Cyruses . Sidney, like most of those who have maintained that poetry is (and ought to be) moral, has not been able to resolve an ambiguity of the word ought as used in the formula. Is this a poetic "ought," or is it in fact only a moral "ought"? In the second sense, "ought to be moral" is a tautology-since moral is what all our works ought to be. ' 7 Sidney includes both extremes within the synthesis, which gives rise to an entirely new mode of discourse, one that, he claims, goes beyond conventional limits. It is, in a sense, more abstract than metaphysics, because it is completely free from nature, unlike the "metaphysic, though it be in the second and abstract notions, and therefore be counted supernatural, yet doth he indeed build upon the depth of Nature" (p. 100). At the same time, it is more concrete than history, since its speaking pictures and shining images are able to instruct and move men immediately.18
Sidney is often seen as a Platonist
There is something unsettling in Sidney's comparison between this special mode and the others. He does not argue the claims of fiction over fact, but he does suggest that all attempts to make sense out of the world are based on illusion; poetry is only a special instance of the fictionality that pervades all discourse. The most casual observation shows that other disciplines use fictions to enhance their effectiveness: lawyers use such fictitious names as "John a Stile" and "John a Noakes" in their cases for the sake of making "their picture the more lively," while chess players call a piece of wood a bishop. So too historians, despite their claims of truthfulness, still give "many particularities of battles, which no man could affirm" and invent "long orations," which historical figures never pronounced (p. 97).
In a profounder sense any attempt at rational communication leads to fiction making. Our only choice is whether or not to acknowledge the pretense. So the historian is described as "loaden with old mouse-eaten records, authorising himself (for the most part) upon other histories, whose greatest authorities are built upon the notable foundation of hearsay." Any art that purports to rest on the foundation of external verities finds that its support quickly disintegrates. Even those who go beyond books to nature find themselves in this vertiginous plight:
There is no art delivered to mankind that hath not the works of Nature for his principal object, without which they could not consist, and on which they so depend, as they become actors and players, as it were, of what Nature will have set forth. At the beginning of the Apology, Sidney tells us that he is following the example of John Pietro Pugliano, the master horseman and selfpromoter, and that in order to defend his own craft, poetry, he needs "to bring some more available proofs." He is alluding to Aristotle's definition of rhetoric as the "faculty of observing in any given case, the available means of persuasion," and so is signaling us that he is about to adopt the role of rhetorician. Kenneth Myrick's book on Sidney makes clear just how selfconscious an actor Sidney is, as he closely models his work after the "judicial oration in behalf of an accused client."21 Sidney, furthermore, seems to remind us continually of the role he is playing. As Myrick demonstrates, Sidney not only follows the seven-part form of an oration as he found it described by Thomas Wilson but does so in elaborate detail, following the recommended subject matter and style for each section and even marking the transitions between them with conspicuous phrases (pp. 54-55). This is a fitting role for Sidney, considering the highly rhetorical role he imagines for poetry. But the paradox thickens when we realize that Sidney is playing not only the rhetorician but the poet as well. He tells us at the start that he has slipped into the title of poet, and he often demonstrates the appropriateness of that title in the Apology. After describing poetry as "feigning notable images of virtues, vices, or what else," Sidney proceeds to "feign notable images" of the poet's competitors, including the moral philosophers, whom he envisions approaching him "with a sullen gravity," and the historian, staggering under a load of mouse-eaten records. There are, of course, advantages to adopting this role. Sidney can demonstrate, even as he describes, the persuasive force of poetry. And by treating his arguments as conjectures, he can arrange a variety of them without strict regard for consistency. He presents us with "something for everyone," aiming different claims at different readers, hoping that all will find something to serve as "an imaginative ground-plot of a profitable invention." We often find, in fact, running counter to what I have described as the central theory, the testing of more conservative possibilities, aimed at those who may be unhappy with the more daring claims for the poet's creativity. We can see this, for example, in the notion of poetic "fitness."
Early in the Apology, when praising the poet's creativity, Sidney argues for the peculiar "reverse adequation" found in critics like Mazzoni. The mind does not fit its concepts to externals but, rather, invents forms to fit its own faculties. Poets are like painters, who, "having no law but wit, bestow that in colours upon you which is fittest for the eye to see" (p. 102). If verse is used in poetry, so much the better, because of the "fitness it hath for memory" (p. 122). But later, when discussing stage productions, Sidney moves far away from the freedom of Mazzoni's idols and closer to the unimaginative literalness of Castelvetro. Unity of place is essential because no audience could believe a rapid change of location. Playwrights are attacked for being too "liberal" with time as well. There must be a correspondence between the imitation and the action imitated. The play should be "fitted to the time it set forth" (p. 134).
These reversals are not restricted to specific questions of dramaturgy. At one moment the poets are free of the works of nature, not enclosed by its "narrow warrant"; at another, they must rely on the "force truth hath in nature," and their proper effects are endangered if the matter is "disproportioned to ourselves and nature" (p. 136). We may even suspect that Sidney is allowing himself to act out his own ambivalence about the poet's "high flying liberty of conceit." Late in the Apology, Sidney tells us that "the highest-flying wit [must] have a Daedalus to guide him," and that this Daedalus has three wings, "Art, Imitation, and Exercise": Exercise indeed we do, but that very fore-backwardly: for where we should exercise to know, we exercise as having known; and so is our brain delivered of much matter which never was begotten by knowledge. Sidney's theory requires that he take an affirmative stand somewhere, that he find some first premise from which to deduce his conclusions. Sidney himself makes this need explicit by reducing his argument to a syllogism: if it be, as I affirm, that no learning is so good as that which teacheth and moveth to virtue, and that none can both teach and move thereto so much as Poetry, then is the conclusion manifest that ink and paper cannot be to a more profitable purpose employed.
( Aristotle, that they were the ancient treasurers of the Grecians' divinity; to believe, with Bembus, that they were first bringers-in of all civility; to believe, with Scaliger, that no philosopher's precepts can sooner make you an honest man than the reading of Virgil; to believe, with Clauserus, the translator of Cornutus, that it pleased the heavenly Deity, by Hesiod and Homer, under the veil of fables, to give us all knowledge, Logic, Rhetoric, Philosophy natural and moral, and quid non?; to believe, with me, that there are many mysteries contained in Poetry, which of purpose were written darkly, lest by profane wits it should be abused; to believe, with Landino, that they are so beloved of the gods that whatsoever they write proceeds of divine fury; lastly, to believe themselves, when they tell you they will make you immortal by their verses.
( Myrick, who gives an excellent survey of Sidney's rhetorical strategies, argues that this kind of playfulness adds to the Apology's persuasiveness. It is a sign of Sidney's sprezzatura, a "courtly grace which conceals a sober purpose" (p. 298). Sidney does praise the courtier who finds a style "fittest to nature" and who "doth according to art, though not by art," and contrasts him to the pedant who uses "art to show art, and not to hide art" (p. 139). But Sidney is not that courtier. Little is hidden by the style of the Apology. His adopted role is announced as an adopted role, and nearly all his persuasive tricks and witty anecdotes are relished as persuasive tricks and demonstrations of wit. We rarely lose sight of the self-conscious fashioning of the Apology and cannot forget that Sidney is, in Myrick's terms, a "literary craftsman" constructing a "literary artifact." It would be tempting to conclude that the Apology acts out its own argument, that the work itself moves us through images and fictions while praising the power of poetry to move us through images and fictions. But if this were so, there would be no real argument to act out, only a fiction that neither affirms nor denies, taking as its subject still other fictions. The Apology requires another Apology to justify it, and so on without end.
What the Apology does act out are the tensions characteristic of the best Renaissance thought. Sidney's intellectual affinities lie not so much with Ficino and the Neoplatonists as with thinkers like Nicholas of Cusa. Cusa, in his most famous work, De Docta Ignorantia, tells us that previous philosophers erred in their attempts to understand the nature of things because of the illusion that the world has some fixed structure. With his doctrine of "learned ignorance," he attempts to free his readers from this mistake by short-circuiting traditional logical categories, teasing his readers with puzzles that lead to a coincidence of opposites. The technique does not free them from illusion but does bring them to recognize its inevitability, allowing them to manipulate it consciously. Cusa calls this free play "conjecture," which encourages the mind to project its own forms of thought-mathematical, symbolic, and metaphorical-onto a world that lacks any inherent rationality.24 Like Sidney, Cusa argues that conjecture, while neither true nor false, has a practical value: it erects the wit and energizes the will, leading man to the Good. It hardly seems necessary to point out that it is often difficult to tell whether we are to take even this claim as yet another conjecture. 
